A New Rule on Obtaining Membership Information: \u3ci\u3eEastland v. United States Servicemen\u27s Fund\u3c/i\u3e, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) by Nagy, Jill Beckoff
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 2 Article 6
1975
A New Rule on Obtaining Membership
Information: Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)
Jill Beckoff Nagy
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Jill Beckoff Nagy, A New Rule on Obtaining Membership Information: Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), 55
Neb. L. Rev. 299 (1976)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol55/iss2/6
Note
A New Rule on
Obtaining Membership Information
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,' the United
States Supreme Court held that an organization may not enjoin
the issuance of a subpoena served on a third party demanding
records of the plaintiff organization which are equivalent to
membership lists. Thus, the Court took a large step toward repudi-
ating the holding of NAACP v. Alabama2 that membership lists
of controversial but legitimate organizations are protected from the
hooks of legislative fishing expeditions and "investigations" which
harass more than they inform.
The case dealt not with membership lists but with equally
important information about contributions. However, the Court's
majority avoided squarely facing the protection issue by resting its
decision on a finding of congressional immunity.
In the process, the Court considerably broadened the scope of
congressional immunity and, if it did not actually overrule NAACP,
it certainly limited its effectiveness. The case may have the
anomolous effect of giving first amendment rights greater protec-
tion from state legislators than from the very Congress which
the first amendment addresses.3
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The case grew out of a subpoena duces tecum4 issued on May
1. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
2. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3. Virtually all the case law protecting membership information resulted
from challenges to the power of state investigating committees. The
leading cases, in addition to NAACP, are Pollard v. Roberts, 393 U.S.
14 (1968); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1962);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1962); and Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
The decision may also reflect the Court's lack of concern for the
protection of "expressive activity" as opposed to "pure speech."
4. A subpoena duces tecum is an order to appear with a particular item,
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28, 1970 by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security 5 in the
course of an investigation of "the administration, operation, and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950, . . . espionage,
sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United
States; and ... subversive activities .... -6
The subpoena was issued to the Chemical Bank New York Trust
Company and demanded the records of the United States Service-
men's Fund, Inc. ("USSF"), a non-profit organization that spon-
sored coffee houses near United States military bases, published
newspapers for servicemen, and otherwise provided forums for dis-
sident opinion among members of the armed forces.7
USSF sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia s
to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena and for a declaratory judg-
ment that both the subpoena and the resolution authorizing it were
void.9 The action was against the subcommittee chairman, Senator
James Eastland, its members and general counsel, and the bank.
The bank, in New York City, however, was dropped as a party
because it could not be served with process. 10
The Fund alleged that the subpoena threatened rights of
privacy, free press, free speech, free association, and freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure of the association and its mem-
bers." It further charged that the subpoena was issued to the
bank rather than directly to the organization in order to deprive
USSF and its members of their rights.'
2
The main thrust of the complaint was an allegation that the
bank records included information about contributors to the organ-
ization and were, therefore, functionally equivalent 3 to member-
in this case, the bank records in question. The subpoena apparently
was never served. 421 U.S. at 494-95 n.4 and accompanying text.
5. This is a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. It is now
headed by Senator James 0. Eastland (D-Miss.) and was at one time
chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.).
6. CONG. REc.: S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 3418
(1970). The date in the Court's opinion is incorrect. See note 48 infra.
7. 421 U.S. at 493-94.
8. Suit was brought in the District of Columbia because the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held in a suit
against the same Subcommittee and its counsel that jurisdic-
tion and venue lay only in the District.
Id. at 513 (concurring opinion).
9. Id. at 496.
10. Id. at 513-14.
11. Id. at 495.
12. Id.
13. The bank records of respondent membership organizations are
functionally the equivalent of their membership lists reveal-
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ship lists and entitled to the same protection. 14 It was also
charged that the mere attempt to find out who had contributed
to the Fund and how much they had given would dry up further
contributions. 15
The district court denied relief, finding that it lacked juris-
diction; that USSF lacked standing; and that there was little chance
that USSF would succeed on the merits.16 The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted a stay in the enforce-
ment of the subpoena, 17 reversed the district court's decision, and
remanded the case for consideration of the prayer for injunctive
and declaratory relief. On the remand, the district court refused
to issue a preliminary injunction on the grounds that USSF had
little chance of ultimate success. The court of appeals issued a
second stay and docketed the appeal of the second district court
decision three months later. In the interim, the case was again
remanded to the district court for consideration of the prayer for
a permanent injunction. The lower court was urged to act expedi-
tiously so that its decision could be reviewed along with the appeal
already docketed.' 8
As requested, the district court acted quickly. It denied the
injunction. In October, the case was heard for the sixth time and
the court of appeals once again reversed the district court.
In its opinion, the court of appeals acknowledged that equity
powers should be used sparingly, even when first amendment rights
ing the identities of supporters and the extent of individual
membership contributions. They would further reveal the
nature and extent of disbursements of various associational
activities protected by the First Amendment.
Brief for Respondents at 7.
There was no real argument on this point. It is clear from both
the Brief for Petitioners and the Court's decision that it was the identi-
fication of contributors that was sought.
14. This argument had been accepted by the Supreme Court in Pollard
v. Roberts, 393 U.S. 14, afjlg per curiam 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.
Ark. 1968).
15. Brief for Respondents at 16-17.
16. 421 U.S. at 496 n.9. See also United States Servicemen's Fund v. East-
land, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for a detailed discussion of the
lower court decisions.
17. 421 U.S. at 496 n.9. The stay was granted only days before the return
date on the subpoena. Id. at 496.
18. It would therefore be in the interest of justice if the case
could proceed expeditiously in the District Court on the mer-
its. The final judgment of the District Court is likely to be
appealed whichever way the court rules.
488 F.2d at 1257.
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were at stake.19 However, the court found "this case differs from
those which have been discussed in that none of the means by which
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights can be vindicated, which existed
in all the previous cases, are here present ... ",20
It rejected the Government's argument of "absolute congres-
sional immunity,"21 and noted that, in most cases, alternate means
of relief are available and, therefore, courts are loath to enjoin con-
gressional action even though they have the power to do so. Here,
the court felt, no other relief was possible.22
Having dismissed the claim of immunity, the court then found
that the threat to the organization's rights posed by the subpoena
outweighed the interest of Congress in getting the information
sought. Consequently, it held that both declaratory and, apparently
for the first time, injunctive relief were available to USSF against
the named senator, his colleagues on the Internal Security Sub-
committee, and the subcommittee's general counsel. The case was
again remanded to the district court, with the recommendation that
declaratory, rather than injunctive, relief be granted.23  That
decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.
24
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINIONS
In the Supreme Court decision, there were three opinions, each
addressing a different issue presented by the case. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, accepted the Government's argu-
ment of absolute congressional immunity and found that the Court
had no power to review the subpoena.25 In a concurring opinion,
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart agreed that the nature of
the instant case made relief impossible but, they suggested that
a different procedure and/or different defendants would provide a
forum for USSF's constitutional claims. The third opinion, Justice
Douglas' dissent, went directly to the first amendment issue and
decided it in favor of the Servicemen's Fund.
19. Id. at 1259.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1258.
22. Id. at 1271. Other relief, of course, was possible, but not in the same
suit. USSF could have sued to prevent service of the subpoena or
compliance by the bank. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
25. Joining Chief Justice Burger were Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist,
White and Powell.
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A. The Majority Opinion
While the majority framed the issue before it in first amendment
terms,2 6 the answer was based entirely on congressional immu-
nity2 7
The Court found that: (I) investigations, such as that of the
Eastland subcommittee, were within the sphere of legislative activ-
ity;28 (2) Congress could issue subpoenae in connection with its in-
vestigations, 2 9 and (3) USSF was a proper subject for investiga-
tion.80 Therefore, the Court reasoned, any subpoena issued in con-
nection with this investigation was immune from judicial review.31
In support of this position, the Court listed the classic speech
and debate clause cases: Doe v. McMilan,3 2 Gravel v. United
States,8s United States v. Brewster,3 4 Powell v. McCormack,5
United States v. Johnson,36 Tenney v. Brandhove, 7 and Kilbourn
v. Thompson. 8 It also listed Barr v. Matteo,3 9 which was not a
congressional immunity case.
4 0
26. ... whether a federal court may enjoin the issuance by
Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that directs a bank to
produce the bank records of an organization which claims a
First Amendment privilege status for those records on the
ground that they are the equivalent of confidential member-
ship lists.
421 U.S. at 492-93.
27. We conclude the actions of the Senate Subcommittee,
the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel are protected
by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I,
§ 6, cl. 1, and are therefore immune from judicial interfer-
ence.
Id. at 501.
The clause reads:
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of
Peace, be privileged from Arrest ... and for any Speech or
Debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
28. 421 U.S. at 504.
29. Id. at 505.
30. Id. at 506.
31. Id. at 507.
32. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
33. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
34. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
35. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
36. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
37. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). This case involved a suit under the Civil Rights
Act against a state legislature.
38. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
39. 36G U.S. 564 (1959).
40. Barr was a libel suit brought by two former subordinates against the
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If there is one unifying thread running through the cases cited
by the Court, it is that the protection of the speech and debate
clause ends when legitimate legislative activity ends: when the
congressionally authorized arrest is made,41 when Congress ex-
ceeds its authority to determine the qualifications of its mem-
bers, 42 when a former senator is charged with accepting a bribe
in connection with his legislative activities,43 when congressional
findings are published to the general public, 44 or when an investi-
gation exceeds the bounds of legislative inquiry and invades the
executive or judicial sphere.
45
Had the Court applied the traditional analysis to the instant case,
it would have found itself powerless to look at the process of
authorizing the subpoena but quite able to examine the contents
of the subpoena, the procedure by which it was delivered and
enforced, and its probable effect upon USSF. This is what the
court of appeals did and what the concurring Justices suggest that
they would do given the proper defendants. 4
In addition to its unusual degree of restraint in dealing with
the issue, the majority opinion contained other aspects that merit
close scrutiny. First, it ignored the rule established in Watkins v.
United States47 that congresssional investigations which threaten
first amendment rights do not receive a presumption of validity.
In the process of doing this, the majority sanctioned an investiga-
tion based upon a Senate resolution identical in tone to that which
former Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. The Court
held that petitioner was immune from suit. Although the matter was
discussed on the floor of Congress, the only immunity alleged was that
of the executive involved.
41. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
42. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
43. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
44. 408 U.S. 606 (1972); 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
45. 341 U.S. 367. It has been suggested that the Tenney decision was
overruled sub silentio in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), when the
Court allowed a suit under the Civil Rights Act against the Georgia
House of Representatives. Reinstein & Sllverglate, Legislative Priv-
ilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1973).
46. Justice MacKinnon, who dissented from the court of appeals decision,
followed the same analysis, but came to a different conclusion. He
argued that the distinguishing fact was that the Eastland subcommit-
tee sought the facts for a legitimate purpose. 488 F.2d at 1277. He
also balanced the interests of USSF and those of Congress and found
those of Congress to be stronger as, he noted, the Supreme Court had
found in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). See 488 F.2d at 1277-78.
47. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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was found to be excessively vague in Watkins. 48 Second, it made
no attempt to consider the Fund's first amendment claims and
balance them against the interests of Congress. It thus possibly
overruled the membership list cases 49 and removed another foun-
dation stone supporting the first amendment's "preferred posi-
tion."50 Last, the opinion failed to distinguish between legitimate
legislative functions and the judicial and administrative activities
in which congressional investigators sometimes engage.
2. The Watkins Burden of Proof Rule
Generally, acts of Congress enjoy a presumption of validity.
48. Watkins, charged with contempt for refusing to answer questions,
challenged the authority of a House committee operating under au-
thority of a House resolution, the relevant portion of which is in the
opinion:
The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by
subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time in-
vestigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-
American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the
diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-
American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries
or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form
of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all
other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in
any necessary remedial legislation.
Id. at 201-02.
The resolution authorizing the Eastland investigation is more ver-
bose, but no more specific:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any
duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under
sections 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdic-
tion specified by rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Sen-
ate insofar as they relate to the authority of the committee, to
make a complete and continuing study and investigation of
(1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the
Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended; (2) the administra-
tion, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to
espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security
of the United States; and (3) the extent, natur% and effect of
subversive activities in the United States, its territories and
possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage,
and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the dom-
ination of the foreign government or organizations controlling
the world Communist movement or any other movement
seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by
force or violence.
CONG. REc.: H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 15 (1953).
49. See note 3 supra.
50. Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are con-
cerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that
it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under
it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and
warns against transgression.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1939).
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One exception to this rule, which was articulated in Watkins, is
that actions which threaten constitutionally protected rights, par-
ticularly first amendment rights, do not receive this presumption.
The Watkins decision also placed a check on the investigative
powers of Congress. 51 More specifically, it made three points
which, if they had been considered in the USSF decision, might have
changed the outcome of that case:
(1) Because a congressional investigation is part of the legisla-
tive function of Congress, it is also subject to the restraint that
the first amendment places upon legislation, namely that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging freedom of speech .... -52
(2) "IT]here is no congressional power to expose . . . where
the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights
of individuals."5 3
(3) When members of Congress exercise authority granted to
the entire Congress, such as the power to subpoena witnesses, they
must be authorized to do so by a narrowly drawn and explicit reso-
lution. The Watkins resolution 4 was found to be excessively
vague; the USSF resolution was never examined.
The first--and probably most important-argument presented
by Watkins was completely ignored in USSF because the Court saw
a veil of immunity covering all congressional activities. However,
given the language of the first amendment, it is difficult to see
how infringement of first amendment rights can be within the
sphere of legitimate legislative activity.
The Watkins Court did not go so far as to say that any infringe-
ment of first amendment rights is ipso facto beyond the pale of
legitimate legislative activity. It did, however, say that anytime
legislative activities threaten first amendment rights, the legislators
have the burden of showing that their investigation and the specific
information sought are sufficiently vital to their legislative function
to justify the infringement. Specifically, the committee in Watkins
51. The investigating committee in that case was the House Committee
on Un-American Activities, later called the House Committee on In-
ternal Security. That same committee was the petitioner in three suits
argued along with Eastland. Those suits were against the National
Peace Action Coalition, the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice,
and the Progressive Labor Party, respectively. None of them was de-
cided because the session of the House in which the subpoenae were
issued. had expired and the committee that issued the subpoenae was
subsequently abolished. 421 U.S. at 511.
52. 354 U.S. at 197.
53. Id.
54. See note 48 supra.
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had the burden of showing that it was not engaged in exposure
for the sake of exposure.
In USSF, the Court placed no such burden on the Eastland sub-
committee. On the contrary, it said:
The propriety of making USSF a subject of the investigation and
subpoena is a subject on which the scope of our inquiry is narrow.
* . . Even the most cursory look at the facts presented by the
pleadings55 reveals the legitimacy of the USSF subpoena. Inquiry
into the sources of funds used to carry on activities suspected by
a Subcommittee of Congress to have a potential for undermining
the morale of the armed forces is within the legitimate legislative
sphere. Indeed, the complaint here tells us that USSF operated on
or near military and naval bases, and that its facilities became
the "focus of dissent" to declared national policy. Whether USSF
activities violated any statute is not relevant; the inquiry was
intended to inform Congress in an area where legislation may be
had.... [I]n light of the Senate authorization to the Subcom-
mittee to investigate "infiltration by persons who are or may be
under the control of foreign governments," . . . and in view of
the pleaded facts, it is clear that the subpoena to discover USSF's
bank records "may be deemed within [the Subcommittee's] prov-
ince.,,56
Since no mention of military morale is made in the subcommittee's
authorizing resolution," it could be argued that the inquiry into
that subject was beyond its sphere.
The characterization of USSF as a "focus of dissent" comes closer
to the spirit of the enabling resolution but that characterization,
even if true, does not by itself make USSF a fit subject for con-
gressional investigation. Congress cannot legislate against dissent;
even the Internal Security Act,58 which the committee was pur-
portedly studying, does not go that far.
What the Senate did authorize the Eastland subcommittee to
study was "infiltration by persons who are or may be under the
domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling
the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to
overthrow the Government of the United States by force or
violence."59 However, even though that aspect of the subcommit-
tee's investigation was authorized, it does not necessarily follow
55. It is a long way from "close scrutiny" to "even the most cursory look
at the facts in the pleadings."
56. 421 U.S. at 506-07.
57. See note 48 supra.
58. The major provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,
are at 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq. Other provisions are at 18 U.S.C. §§
791, 792, 793, 871, 1501 and 1507, and 22 U.S.C. § 618.
59. See note 48 supra.
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that the specific information sought was vital-and the subcommit-
tee was not required to show that it was. Indeed, it is difficult
to see what legitimate use could have been made of the information.
Even if the subcommittee were to find that USSF was infiltrated
or controlled by Communists and others seeking to overthrow
the Government, there was little that the subcommittee could do.
It could not recommend legislation outlawing USSF. That would
constitute a bill of attainder. 60 More general legislation against
such infiltration already exists and its enforcement is not a legis-
lative function.6'
Rather than presume from "the most cursory look at the facts
presented in the pleadings" that the subpoena was valid, the Court
could have posed the questions the Watkins Court did: Is this
information that is sought by subpoena sufficiently vital to a
specifically defined legislative task to override first amendment
claims? Is this subpoena drawn narrowly enough to reach only
the information needed?
6 2
Had these questions been asked, it is conceivable that the
Eastland subcommittee could have justified the subpoena. 3 How-
ever, until such justification can be given, the burden of proof
required by the rule of Watkins is not met.
2. The First Amendment Claims
The first amendment claims of USSF were presented in a
somewhat unusual framework. Commonly, such claims reach the
courts as defenses to contempt citations arising from a refusal to
honor subpoenae or to answer questions. Furthermore, all the cases
challenging subpoenae of membership lists64 have involved state
investigations.
60. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 9. A bill of attainder is a legislative act directed
against a designated person, pronouncing him guilty of an alleged
crime and punishing him for it.
61. For example, the Internal Security Act, note 58 supra.
62. These questions are another way of phrasing the traditional first
amendment tests of compelling government interest and least re-
strictive means.
63. The case would probably have been based upon the defense power
and the allegation that USSF was disrupting the conduct of the war
in Southeast Asia. Further, it could have been argued that cases such
as Barenblatt and Wyman, note 46 supra, stand for the proposition that
Congress may investigate allegedly subversive organizations, even to
the extent of asking individuals if they are members of such organiza-
tions. It could also be argued that if the Internal Security Act was
not effectively stifling such subversion, either amendments or a new
law might be needed.
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The court of appeals quickly disposed of the first factual differ-
ence when it noted that the challenge before it was the only means
available to USSF to assert its rights and those of its contributors.
The organization could not be cited for contempt since the subpoena
was not issed to it nor could it expect the bank to risk a contempt
citation.6 5
In light of the fact that the Court based its decision upon a find-
ing of immunity, the second distinction is more serious. However,
most states have legislative immunity provisions similar to that in
the Federal Constitution 66 and, in addition, a court could assume
the existence of a common law immunity where no statutory or
constitutional provision existed.
6 7
Of the greatest importance, however, was the fact that although
the posture of this case was different, the claim was identical to
that made in NAACP and the other membership list cases: an
organization may protect its members from infringement of their
rights of privacy and free association.
Nowhere in the majority opinion was this claim seriously consid-
ered. Instead, it was dismissed in these terms:
Finally, respondents argue that the purpose of the subpoena
was to "harass, chill, punish and deter them" in the exercise of
their First Amendment rights .... Their theory seems to be
that once it is alleged that First Amendment rights may be in-
fringed by congressional action the judiciary may intervene to
protect those rights; the Court of Appeals seems to have sub-
scribed to that theory. That approach, however, ignores the abso-
lute nature of the speech and debate protection and our cases
which have broadly construed that protection.68
Not only did the Court deny relief to USSF; it also reprimanded
it for bringing the action at all:
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interven-
tion may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for
nearly five years during which the Members and their aides have
been obliged to devote time to consultation with their counsel
concerning the litigation, and have been distracted from the pur-
pose of their inquiry.69
64. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
65. 488 F.2d at 1260.
66. In 1950, forty-one states had legislative immunity provisions.
67. This would be similar to the immunity enjoyed by members of the
executive and judicial branches of government.
68. 419 U.S. at 508-09. The Court than quoted dictum from Gravel and
McMillan, two cases where congressmen had exceeded their legislative
authority. Id. at 509.
69. Id.
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Contrast this approach with that used in the NAACP decision.
70
In the latter case, the Court first identified the rights of its mem-
bers which the organization sought to protect. It then acknowl-
edged that only the organization could protect those rights. Fi-
nally, it asked whether Alabama had shown a sufficiently compell-
ing reason for interfering with these rights and found that it had
not.
That same sort of analysis could have been applied to the USSF
claim. Instead, the Court approached the problem from the other
end, and asked only if the subcommittee was "legislating." It did
not even press that inquiry very hard.
The protection of membership information is not absolute, as
the Court has noted in NAACP and elsewhere. 71 However, the
burden is properly on the Government to show why, in a particular
instance, the protection should be denied.
3. Legitimate Legisiative Functions
As already suggested,' 2 issuance of the subpoena in question
may not have been a legitimate legislative function even if, as the
Court asserted, the Eastland subcommittee's investigation was
properly legislative.
The question, "Is this a legitimate legislative function?," may be
posed at any step of the investigative process: when Congress
authorizes the investigation; when the committee, interpreting that
authorization, sets the focus of its investigation; when the commit-
tee studies a particular organization or person; when it decides to
seek particular information about that person or organization;
when it chooses the method of acquiring the information; and when
the chosen method is executed.
In this case, the Court did not inquire beyond the first steps.
Rather than look at the content and probable effect of the subpoena,
it looked at the surroundings from which it emerged. The majority
opinion asserted that those surroundings-a subcommittee investi-
gation authorized by a Senate resolution-were within the sphere
70. The case is only cited once in the Court's references to the decision
of the court of appeals.
71. Such protection has been denied the Communist Party and the Ku
Klux Klan. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961); Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). Even
in NAACP, the protection was a value to be balanced against the pur-
pose of the legislative investigators.
72. See notes 48 and 54 supra and accompanying text,
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,of legitimate legislative function and, having said that, refused to
look further.
As is evident from decisions of this and other courts, not every-
thing done by legislators is legislation, even if it is done under the
aegis of a valid resolution. Therefore, not everything a legislator
does is protected by the speech and debate clause. Thus, even
if, as the Court says, the immunity of that clause is absolute,78
it can only be absolute during speech and debate and closely related
activities. The further an activity gets from actual speech and
debate on the floor of Congress, the less likely that it will be
entitled to immunity. A subpoena is sufficiently far from the core
of legislative activity to warrant close scrutiny, particularly when,
as here, it threatens first amendment rights.
4. The Argument Against Immunity
The meager history of the speech and debate clause has been
retold many times, and is- recounted again in this decision.74 The
clause was apparently included in the Constitution with little or no
debate75 and, until fairly recently, carried little judicial gloss.76
It seems, however, that its main intent was to maintain separation
of powers by protecting legislators from interference by the execu-
tive branch. It may also have been the result of a compromise
reached with advocates of legislative secrecy.77 In any case, its pri-
mary intent does not seem to have been to provide a license to in-
vade constitutionally protected rights of private citizens.
It could even be argued that first amendment freedoms deserve
"more absolute" protection than legislative activities. The speech
and debate clause and the first amendment are couched in the
same mandatory language. The latter, however, is an amendment
-a revision-of the document containing the former.
The point has also been made that suits by private individuals
seeking to assert their constitutional rights do not pose the threat
73. 421 U.S. at 503.
74. Id. at 502. See also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 45; and Cella,
The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and De-
bate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecution
in the Courts, 2 SuFFOLK L. REv. 1 (1968).
75. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 45, at 1120 et seq.
76. From the time of the adoption of the Constitution until 1966, only four
cases concerning the clause reached the Supreme Court's docket and
only two of them had been decided on the merits. One of those was
Tenney, in which the discussion of federal legislative immunity was
dictum. The instant case is the sixth the Court has decided since 1966.
Id. at 1114.
77. Id.. at 1137-38.
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to Congress that executive interference would and, moreover, the
effects on the individual are often great."8
The present case illustrates that thesis. The threat to Congress
was so minimal (delay in a small aspect of a continuing investiga-
tion) and the threat to the organization so great (extinction of its
funding and, probably, its existence) that it may be inappropriate
even to consider a congressional immunity claim. In any case, it
seems inappropriate to give it the presumption of validity it
received from the Court.
B. The Concurring Opinion
The majority opinion suggested that once a legitimate legislative
function was discovered, a court could inquire no further. The con-
curring Justices stated a more moderate position: a court will not
inquire into legislative activities (which, in this case, included the
subcommittee's decision to issue the subpoena), but it will look at
the result of that activity. However, they said that since the only
parties to USSF's lawsuit were the decision-makers, the Court's
hands were tied.
The concurring opinion refrained from spelling out the alternate
routes USSF might have taken. 7 9  A suit against the marshal
who delivered the subpoena or the bank itself might have provided
the desired forum in which to set out its position. Because that
solution would require a second series of suits, it is somewhat inef-
ficient. It does, however, have the virtue of preserving the
amenities of the separation of powers.
In Pollard v. Roberts"0 the Court was faced with a case in
78. Id. at 1173-74.
79. This case does not present the questions of what would be the
proper procedure, and who might be the proper parties de-
fendant, in an effort to get before a court a constitutional'
challenge to a subpoena duces tecum issued to a third party.
As respondent's counsel conceded at oral argument, this case
is at an end if the Senate petitioners are upheld in their claim
of immunity as they must be.
421 U.S. at 517-18 (concurring opinion).
80. 393 U.S. 14 (1968). See note 14 supra. This also would have avoided
presenting the Court with a suit directly against a member of Con-
gress. The Court has seemed more comfortable dealing with cases,
such as Kilbourn or Powell, which address an employee of Congress.
There is, however, no clear rule on the immunity of aides and employ-
ees. In Gravel, the Court spoke of aides as their employers' "alter
egos," sharing their immunity. 408 U.S. at 616-17, 621. However, in
Dombrowski, the Court said, ". .. this doctrine is less absolute, al-
though applicable, when applied to officers or employees . . . ." 387
U.S. at 85. The employee referred to in Dombrowski is the same sub-
committee counsel, Sourwine, originally a party to the USSF suit.
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the mould the concurring Justices seemed to require. When so
confronted, it did agree to an injunction prohibiting a bank from
turning over the Arkansas Republican Party's records to a state
prosecutor acting as a grand jury.8 1 That case, however, raised
no issue of legislative immunity8 2 because the subpoena was not
issued by a legislative committee.8 3 The Republican Party's posi-
tion was similar to that of USSF. It claimed that the investigation
was meant to harass and stunt its growth.8 4 The Court recognized
that, ordinarily, neither a bank nor its depositors has any privilege
to prevent disclosure of bank records.8 5
This, however, is not an ordinary case. Apart from any right
of the Party, as such, to have the information in question re-
spected, individual contributors have the right to remain anony-
mous.8 6 They cannot assert that right themselves without de-
feating their own purpose; if a party cannot protect the Bank
records in the interest of the individual contributors, their right
to privacy is nuflified.87
This was precisely the argument made by the Servicemen's Fund
and accepted by the court of appeals. The majority appeared to
reject it out of hand when faced with a challenge to a congressional
subpoena but the three concurring Justices strongly suggest that,
in a proper suit, it would be a proper argument.
C. The Dissent
Justice Douglas' dissent is appealing in its simplicity and brevity.
For him, individual rights, particularly those protected by the first
amendment, must be sheltered from excesses of legislative zeal:
Under our federal regime that delegates, by the Constitution and
Acts of Congress, awesome powers to individuals, that power may
not be used to deprive people of their First Amendment or other
constitutional rights. It is my view that no official, no matter
81. 393 U.S. 14 (1968). Arkansas law allows such one-man grand juries.
82. This is the only meaningful distinction between Pollard and the pres-
ent case.
83. If a prosecutor's subpoena can be enjoined, the subpoena of a legisla-
tive body should be even more vulnerable because issuance of sub-
poenae is central to the function of a prosecutor, but only tangential
to that of a legislator.
84. 283 F. Supp. at 252.
85. Id. at 255. Both parties in Eastland agreed that no such privilege ex-
ists. See Brief for Respondents at 18-21 and Brief for Petitioners at
16.
86. In view of this "right to be anonymous," one might question the appli-
cability to small and controversial political organizations of "election
reform" laws requiring the reporting of contributions.
87. 283 F. Supp. at 257.
314 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 2 (1976)
how high or majestic his or her office, who is within the reach
of judicial process, may invoke immunity for his actions for
which wrongdoers normally suffer.88
His opinion, however, suffers from faults opposite to those of
the majority. Whereas the majority was completely stymied by
the jurisdictional questions of whether the senators were "within
the reach of judicial process," Justice Douglas assumed them away.
That assumption, however, was based upon his dissent in Tenney
v. Brandhove,s 9 to which he referred. In that opinion he sketched
what, to him, were the outlines of legislative immunity:
It is speech and debate in the legislative department which
our constitutional scheme makes privileged. Included, of course,
are the actions of legislative committees that are authorized to
conduct hearings or make investigations so as to lay the founda-
tion for legislative action. But we are apparently holding today
that the actions of those committees have no limits in the eyes
of the law....
No other public official has complete immunity for his actions. 90
Tenney was a Civil Rights Act case in which a former witness
attempted to sue a legislative committee. Although the majority
in that case held the committee immune from suit, nevertheless,
Douglas' analysis is still instructive. When asking whether activity
is within a committee's legitimate legislative sphere, he emphasized
the word "legitimate." Clearly, activity that infringes upon first
amendment rights is not, in Justice Douglas' view, legitimate.
This may be the very type of analysis that the majority feared
would emasculate the speech and debate clause. On the other
hand, it is not an approach which is strange to the Court. It was
used, for example, in Powell,91 when the Court told Congress how
far it might go in passing upon the qualifications of its members.
Similar analysis has been applied to administrative decisions and
to claims of executive privilege.
9 2
For Justice Douglas, the threshold question seemed to be, "Are
constitutional rights threatened?" He would recognize no immu-
nity when that question received an affirmative answer.
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems disingenuous for a Court that has rewritten state law
88. 421 U.S. at 518 (dissenting opinion).
89. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
90. Id. at 382-83.
91. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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on murder,93 abortion,94 and obscenity;9 5 twice reprimanded a
sitting president;9 6 revised constitutional tests of equal protec-
tion9" and standing to bring first amendment claims;98 and pre-
viously examined the balance between claims of privacy or execu-
tive immunity and those of congressional immunity" to now refuse
to examine the content and effect of a congressional subpoena.
Perhaps it was thought best to avoid the issue. With both the
draft and American involvement in a Southeast Asian war at an
end, the claims of USSF were largely moot. Furthermore, the
House of Representatives had disbanded its counterpart of the East-
land subcommittee and it may be that the Court expected the
Senate to follow suit. It is also possible that the Court, already
split three ways, would have split further in dealing with the first
amendment claims of USSF and such fragmentation was thought
inadvisable. 10 0 It may even be a good omen that the Court had
the grace to abstain; the alternative could have been an explicit
overruling of NAACP.
Jill Beckoff Nagy, '77
93. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), which revises Maine's stat-
ute.
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); and the Pentagon Papers Case, New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
97. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
98. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
99. 412 U.S. 306 (1973); 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
100. There were nine opinions filed, in addition to the per curiam decision
of the Court, in the Pentagon Papers case. In another controversial
case, Furman v. Georgia, 408 TJ.S. 238 (1972), the death penalty case,
there were nine opinions in all.
